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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Although politics and ideology long have played a role in federal 
judicial appointment and elevation,1 that role has swelled in recent 
years. Ongoing Senate confirmation battles over federal court nomi-
nees and rampant speculation about potential retirements from the 
Rehnquist Court have morphed into mainstream news. One critique 
of this ongoing fascination with the appointment process is that it is 
fundamentally out of focus. The contemporary debate centers on pre-
dicting how a putative Justice might (or might not) tip the balance on 
hotbed political issues rather than on merit or qualification for judi-
cial service. Consequently, the debate says very little about how 
                                                                                                                     
 * Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; Adjunct Professor of 
Law, Boston College Law School; Adjunct Professor of Law, Boston University School of 
Law. B.A., Harvard College, 1955; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1958. 
 1. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 619, 620 (2003) (observing that despite the curiosity that “every generation 
has the sense that it is the first to uncover that ideology has a role in the judicial selection 
process,” in fact, “[e]very President in American history, to a greater or lesser extent, has 
chosen federal judges, in part, based on their ideology”). 
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those dimensions might be measured. Traditionally, the American 
Bar Association has produced a qualitative measure of merit (which 
it provides to the President, the Attorney General, and the Senate 
Judiciary Committee) that evaluates the integrity, professional com-
petence, and judicial temperament of each federal judicial nominee 
and designates each nominee as well qualified, qualified, or not 
qualified.2 This system, though valuable in some aspects, has limited 
utility because its “thumbs-up/thumbs-down” approach provides 
meager information about the relative merits of the nominees. More-
over, its legitimacy as a nonpartisan measure has come under attack 
by researchers who suggest that it could be a disguised political de-
vice.3  
 Two academics, Professors Choi and Gulati, have reacted to the 
perceived hyperpoliticization of the federal judicial appointment and 
elevation processes by calling for the development of “objective” 
measures for evaluating judicial talent. To this end, Professors Choi 
and Gulati have put forth a particularly provocative proposal for a 
“Tournament of Judges” (the “Tournament”)—an ongoing empirical 
contest among federal appellate judges that would purport to tabu-
late objective measures of judicial performance (such as opinion pub-
lication rates, citation rates, and frequency of dissent) and would 
rank judges according to their overall scores.4 In the authors’ con-
struct, the highest-ranked judge would be offered up as the heir ap-
parent to the next Supreme Court vacancy.5 Choi and Gulati appar-
ently believe that their Tournament will produce one of two desirable 
results: either politics will take a back seat to merit or, failing that, a 
politically motivated nomination will no longer be able to masquer-
ade as merit-based.6 Even short of Supreme Court appointment, they 
posit, the Tournament would infuse the federal appellate bench with 
an “otherwise absent external incentive” for excellence in perform-
ance.7 A ranking system would hold judges accountable to high per-
                                                                                                                     
 2. AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS 
AND HOW IT WORKS 1 n.1, 3, 8 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/ 
Federal_Judiciary%20(2).pdf. The ABA Standing Committee’s ratings on judicial 
nominees can be accessed at http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/ratings.html. 
 3. See, e.g., James Lindgren, Examining the American Bar Association’s Ratings of 
Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for Political Bias, 1989-2000, 17 J.L. & POL. 1, 6 
(2001) (asserting that “[e]xtensive data analysis [of the ABA ratings] revealed different 
patterns for evaluating Clinton and Bush appointees”). 
 4. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299, 303 
(2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Tournament]. 
 5. See id. For a follow-up article in which the Tournament’s architects run the num-
bers to show how such a competition would operate, see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 
S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking]. 
 6. See Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 4, at 301. 
 7. Id. at 304. 
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formance standards because the potential reward of elevation and 
the reputational benefits of superstar status would motivate them to 
excel.8 Conversely, the risks of decreased peer respect and public em-
barrassment would ensure good work even from those judges who 
have no realistic prospect of elevation or who are indifferent to judi-
cial celebrity. 
 On the surface, these dual objectives—merit-based elevation and 
increased incentive to perform—may have a patina of plausibility. 
But there is more here than meets the eye. This Essay examines 
whether these objectives are worth pursuing in the abstract and then 
considers whether objective measures are likely to produce the re-
sults bruited by the sponsors of the Tournament.9  
II.   OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF MERIT AND THE SUPREME COURT 
APPOINTMENT PROCESS 
 In the abstract, the task of developing objective measures of judi-
cial performance seems straightforward. Achieving objective meas-
ures would assist in the selection of Supreme Court Justices both by 
providing standardized information about merit—valuable in itself 
for identifying the best candidates—and by gleaning the extent to 
which ideological alignment, diversity concerns, or other non-merit-
based factors might drive a particular process of nomination and con-
firmation. It is, however, instructive to peek beneath the coverlet. 
A.   Do We Need Objective Measures of Merit to Identify the Most 
Qualified Candidates? 
 The primary function of objective measurement systems (such as 
the proposed Tournament) is to provide a standardized set of data in 
order to foster informed decisionmaking. The assumption underlying 
the perceived need for such data is that the informal, ad hoc methods 
currently employed to determine which candidates make the final cut 
are somehow deficient or that they lead to bad results. That assump-
tion is somewhat puzzling. Although the existing process may be dis-
cursive and sometimes opaque, no one has made the case that it pro-
duces disagreeable outcomes (that is, that it results generally in the 
appointment or elevation of unqualified jurists). By any reasonable 
measure, the Article III judiciary comprises an array of talented men 
and women. This can only mean that there is an underlying merit-
based quality control system at work. This system operates effec-
tively, if somewhat obscurely, to ensure that, politics aside, success-
                                                                                                                     
 8. Id. 
 9. Though I focus on the Choi/Gulati proposal, I take that proposal to be representa-
tive of a broader bid to introduce empirical measures of judicial performance into the fed-
eral judicial system. 
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ful candidates have passed a certain threshold of merit. Thus, the 
real impetus behind objective measures cannot merely be a desire to 
ensure that candidates are qualified. 
 In fact, the absence of debate about the merits of nominees quite 
likely indicates that an informal but highly merit-conscious system of 
preliminary screening is already in place. To illustrate their point 
that decisionmakers eschew merit-based discussion, Choi and Gulati 
point to examples of political opponents talking past one another 
(such as the situation in which a proponent of a candidate asserts 
that the candidate is highly qualified and, instead of challenging that 
assertion head-on, the opponent responds with her ideological objec-
tions to the candidate’s elevation).10  
 This claim that politics too often drowns out the merits fails to ac-
knowledge that Presidents rarely submit nominees who would not 
fare well under an objective ranking system and that, as a result of 
that preliminary vetting, most nominees who come before the Senate 
easily meet or exceed any reasonable set of merit-based benchmarks. 
Were a candidate’s qualifications miserable or even comparatively 
underwhelming, one would expect the candidate’s foes to pounce on 
the fact of mediocrity rather than to engage in ideological polemics. 
In most cases, however, the fact of nomination is shorthand for the 
achievement of a behind-the-scenes consensus about objective quali-
fication, such that public debate shifts almost immediately to more 
contentious issues. 
 Indeed, structural pressures all but guarantee that a President 
will nominate candidates who are highly qualified in terms of intelli-
gence, experience, and skill. By vesting the nomination power solely 
in the hands of the President,11 the Constitution concentrates ac-
countability in a single individual. The caliber of the nominees will 
reflect directly upon the President. Alexander Hamilton wrote in The 
Federalist No. 76 that “[t]he sole and undivided responsibility of [the 
President] will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more 
exact regard to reputation. [The President] will, on this account, feel 
himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to investi-
gate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled 
. . . .”12 In contrasting presidential appointment with the alternative 
of appointment by a multimember assembly, Hamilton observed that 
in the latter case “the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too of-
ten out of sight.”13 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 5, at 26 & n.3, 27; Choi & Gu-
lati, Tournament, supra note 4, at 321 & n.55. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Modern Library ed. 
1937). 
 13. Id. at 493. 
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 Nor is there a mandate or even an implicit norm that requires a 
President to offer seats on the Supreme Court as a reward for being 
the best in terms of intelligence, skill, or service on a lower court. 
Therefore, respect for the nominating power and regard for the many 
nuanced components that enter into the selection process counsel 
against lodging merit-based objections unless a particular nominee is 
in fact poorly qualified. Merit operates only as a threshold, not as the 
ultimate determinant. One can argue for increasing the height of the 
threshold limit, but even if that is done, there still will remain a 
group of aspirants who can exceed it. It is nothing short of utopian to 
think there will be only one. 
 In sum, for all that can be said about the lack of mainstream dis-
cussion of merit, there exists no plausible basis for a substantiated 
claim that the present process fails to yield top-notch Justices. If an 
objective measurement system is redundant because it identifies 
roughly the same pool of candidates that historically have been con-
sidered and chosen, there will be very little tolerance for any costs 
that such an innovation imposes. The question, then, is whether the 
game is worth the candle. 
B.   Do Objective Measures of Merit Serve the Goal of Political 
Transparency? 
 The idea of developing objective measures of merit to direct Su-
preme Court appointment grows out of a desire to reduce the politici-
zation that has increasingly plagued the process of nominating and 
confirming appeals court judges (and that threatens to embroil fu-
ture Supreme Court nominees). This is a matter of preference, not of 
constitutional mandate. The Constitution assigns the responsibility 
of choosing Supreme Court Justices to the political branches of the 
federal government,14 and therefore it is unsurprising that ideology 
factors into the exercise of the nomination and confirmation powers. 
As a normative matter, that is as it should be.15 Even assuming that 
the extirpation of politics from the nomination and confirmation pro-
cesses is a goal supportable on other grounds—and that is a 
stretch—I have no faith that any system of rankings would achieve 
it. From my perspective, political transparency—and not some false 
promise of liberation from politics—is the touchstone in considering 
the value of objective measures. 
 Seen in this light, the argument for the use of objective measures 
is that while we may not be able to eliminate the politics, we can at 
                                                                                                                     
 14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 15. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 628 (arguing that “ideology should be consid-
ered because the judicial selection process is the key majoritarian check on an anti-
majoritarian institution”). 
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least unmask the political subtexts that underlie conflicting claims 
that a particular aspirant is either an intellectual giant or an intel-
lectual pygmy of the kind whom we consider to be qualified/not quali-
fied to serve on the Supreme Court. The example that Choi and Gu-
lati offer is a presidential nominee who ranks forty-second out of 160 
active circuit court judges on the merit-based scale.16 In that situa-
tion, they assert, a neutral observer can conclude that some factor 
other than objective merit (say, ideology) is driving the selection.17 
 That is hardly rocket science. Yet another equally likely scenario 
demonstrates how a ranking system may serve to provide an impene-
trable cover for an essentially ideological choice. While a President 
may have some explaining to do if he nominates number forty-two, 
he will escape the burden of revealing his calculus if he picks a can-
didate from the top tier (say, from the fifteen top-ranked circuit 
judges), regardless of whether he bases that selection on the candi-
date’s ideological alignment. In that way, a President will be able to 
hide behind the very metric that the Tournament’s advocates have 
intended as a means of making his motivations transparent. Al-
though Choi and Gulati submit that the “introduction of a norm to 
apply objective criteria will force politicians to provide more justifica-
tion for their selection,”18 it may very well accomplish exactly the op-
posite result. 
 The likely proliferation of multiple “objective” metrics also may 
undermine the goal of political transparency. Merit, like beauty, of-
ten lies in the eye of the beholder. If decisionmakers do come to rely 
on a merit-based ranking system, the lure of potential influence on 
the appointment process doubtless will spawn a market of competing 
objective indices, each claiming greater accuracy. Savants, docents, 
and other interested parties will lose little time in developing formu-
las designed to reach particular results. Consequently, any ranking 
system will face constant criticism that it is a proxy for either politi-
cal affiliation or ideological leanings rather than for merit. I fear that 
the jousting between warring indices would repoliticize the selection 
process at a level even further removed from the relative qualifica-
tions of judicial aspirants. The goal of political transparency will not 
be served by a band of cleverly designed ranking systems that merely 
masquerade as objective measures. 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 5, at 28. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 30. 
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C.   Are Objective Measures of Judicial Performance Apt Indicators of 
Qualification to Serve on the Court? 
 Even if one assumes that, in the abstract, an objective ranking 
system could assist in the selection of candidates for the Supreme 
Court and could improve the political transparency of the process, 
the fact remains that a ranking system is only as effective as its 
component criteria. Choi and Gulati posit that judicial merit can be 
measured by a composite of “productivity,” “quality,” and “independ-
ence.”19 To measure productivity, they factor in the number of major-
ity and dissenting opinions a judge has written and the number of 
cases in which the judge has participated.20 To gauge quality, they 
seize on what they believe to be an already accessible market test for 
that attribute: looking at how often and how prominently a judge’s 
opinions are cited by other courts and academics.21 Finally, to gauge 
judicial independence, they reason that disagreement, particularly 
opposition to the opinion of a colleague appointed by a President of 
the same party, indicates that the judge has a mind of her own, and 
thus dissent rates constitute a valid proxy for this attribute.22 
 While there is arguably some relationship between these three in-
dices and judicial merit, I doubt that the correlation is close enough 
to justify placing much weight on a composite ranking, let alone to 
justify using such a ranking as the primary filter for narrowing the 
field of candidates for elevation.23 My concerns fall into two general 
categories. First, I sense a series of disjunctures between the stated 
criteria and the concept of judicial merit. Second, even if the proxies 
were acceptable, they would be inherently manipulable by the con-
testants. I consider each index in turn. 
1.   The Productivity Index 
 In evaluating the productivity index, my immediate concern is 
that this measure is underinclusive because it ignores a range of ap-
pellate activities. Though writing opinions is the primary work of the 
appellate judge, that activity captures only part of the occupation. In 
                                                                                                                     
 19.  Id. at 42 (defining the terms productivity, quality, and independence for the pur-
poses of their article). 
 20. For a more detailed description of this methodology, see id. at 42-47. 
 21. Id. at 48. 
 22. See id. at 61-67 (explaining the methodology for calculating the independence 
measure). 
 23. Professors Choi and Gulati readily acknowledge that the Tournament’s measures 
are flawed in many ways but dismiss these defects by downplaying what is in many ways 
the Tournament’s most attractive selling point—that it actually will tell us something 
about merit so that we can evaluate candidates on that basis. To do this, they inch away 
from the question whether the Tournament gets it right when it comes to identifying merit 
and instead insist that so long as the Tournament unmasks political forces, it is a valuable 
tool. See id. at 35-36. 
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the interest of expediency, judges decide many cases by issuing 
judgments or memorandum orders, without full-dress opinions. 
Those devices are utilitarian, and their appropriate use should not be 
discouraged. Judges also regularly serve on duty panels that decide 
motions and other procedural matters—while it is not glamorous 
work, it is, nonetheless, necessary. At the request of the President or 
the Chief Justice, some judges undertake service on bodies such as 
the Sentencing Commission, the Judicial Panel on Multi-District 
Litigation, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and commit-
tees of the Judicial Conference. This service often limits the number 
of cases that a judge hears in his own court. Finally, many judges are 
forced to restrict their sitting schedules in order to carry out the ad-
ministrative burdens that are essential to the operation of the federal 
courts. 
 While the underinclusivity of the index is arguably correctable to 
some extent, it highlights the ease with which one can rig a ranking 
system to produce particular results by selectively including certain 
factors and excluding others. Moreover, this deficiency reminds us 
that ranking systems are scarcely masters of nuance; a particular 
candidate will fare well only if she fits the mold that the index con-
structs. Designing that index is a normative task that demands some 
agreement about what merit means. This enhances the likelihood 
that competing versions of merit—versions that are likely insepara-
ble in certain ways from judicial philosophy (read “ideology”)—will 
produce competing indices, thereby clouding an observer’s ability to 
discern merit. 
 My next criticism is that the productivity factor is deceptively 
straightforward. By placing productivity on a pedestal, the ranking 
indulges an assumption that we want Supreme Court Justices who 
are docket-movers. That is a wholly untested notion of merit. Indeed, 
the index assumes that those who write more slowly or less often are 
inefficient, lazy, distracted, or just plain incompetent. That assump-
tion is a canard: it unfairly demeans judges who subscribe to a phi-
losophy of restraint or those who believe that publication for publica-
tion’s sake tends to confuse the law.24 The point is that the index has 
its biases—and more troubling still, those biases may not be immedi-
ately apparent. 
 Manipulability is also a concern. Judges, to varying degrees, exer-
cise control over their own numbers. If a judge wanted to increase 
her productivity score, she might work harder, take more cases, and 
produce more opinions. So long as this were done without sacrificing 
quality, this option would bring about a higher ranking while helping 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See Hon. Bruce M. Selya, Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Federal Appeals 
Judge in the Information Age, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 407-08 (1994). 
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the administration of justice. But a judge might avail herself of other 
options to effect a score increase without accomplishing any systemic 
gains. She could, for example, sacrifice quality for quantity, dash off 
gratuitous concurrences or dissents, shy away from demanding cases 
in search of easy prey, or use a host of other tactics. These myriad 
opportunities for “strategic gaming” of the numbers would further 
debilitate the effectiveness of the index as a proxy for merit. 
 Last—but far from least—there are real costs to introducing new 
behavioral incentives into an institution in which justice has long 
been thought the cardinal goal. Hasty and unnecessary opinions gen-
erally make for bad law, and manipulative behavior may erode both 
the credibility of the system and the collegiality that is so necessary 
to the effective functioning of an appellate court. The point is that 
even though a productivity index may incentivize genuine improve-
ments, there is an equal or greater risk that it will encourage behav-
iors inimical to the development of decisional law and to the legiti-
macy of the federal courts. 
2.   The Quality Index 
 The assertion that consumption indicates quality may have some 
truth in it because judges and academics concerned with producing 
coherent rationales are unlikely to rely on poorly reasoned ones. At 
least two distortions, however, will likely interfere with the quality 
signal. 
 The first problem with culling a quality score from citation rates 
is that all citations are not created equal. A citation may signal that 
the authoring judge produced an apt statement of a commonly used 
standard or a path-breaking approach to a complex area of the law. 
Absent a sophisticated coding system—one that would doubtless in-
volve subjective judgments—the rankings would not record such nu-
ances. 
 A second problem (and perhaps one that we should associate more 
generally with all supposedly objective measures of judicial perform-
ance) arises from the fact that subsequent authors will come to rely 
upon the rankings themselves, particularly the quality index, as a 
shorthand for quality. This will create a sort of self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. Judges who rank high on the quality index will likely earn re-
spect in the legal community, thereby increasing the probability that 
other judges and academics will cite their opinions. Future citation 
rates will then say less about the quality of a cited opinion and more 
about the entrenched reputation of the original writing judge. This il-
lustrates the Achilles’ heel of the Tournament proposal. Rankings 
tend to take on a life of their own, and many people tend to rely on 
them without knowing much about what they really signify. Put 
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bluntly, rankings too often disengage “the thing” from “the thing sig-
nified” and thereby frustrate the objective (informed, substantive de-
liberation) for which they purport to supply a foundation. 
 Moreover, the quality index is ripe for manipulation. Any judge 
worth his salt will tell you that there are ways to write opinions that 
make citation more likely. Judges can boost citation rates by writing 
longer opinions, publishing opinions that would otherwise go unpub-
lished, eschewing quotations, taking controversial positions, or 
reaching for novel issues at the margin of a case. Accordingly, fre-
quency of citation sometimes may signal better strategy rather than 
better quality. 
3.   The Independence Index 
 The independence index aims to capture the intellectual inde-
pendence of the judge by measuring his willingness to disagree with 
his colleagues.25 This is pure fiction: rates of dissent are an invalid 
proxy for judicial independence. Many judges write fewer dissents 
because they ascribe a relatively high value to the institutional good 
of courts speaking with a single voice, and they are willing to work 
toward developing a template to which the entire panel can sub-
scribe. A low dissent rate for such a judge is a badge of honor, not of 
shame. In all events, it tells us nothing about his independence. 
 Even if a judge’s rate of dissent provides some tiny amount of in-
formation about her independence, it is not clear that independence 
in that sense is a desirable trait. After all, there plainly is a point at 
which dissenters cross the line from enriching thought into either in-
tellectual preening or obstructionist polemicism. The sponsors of this 
proxy thus overlook the obvious danger in encouraging dissent for its 
own sake (or more precisely, for the sake of a better independence 
score). 
 Furthermore, Choi and Gulati have conceded that a particular 
ranking system could elect to place a negative weight on dissent.26 
This concession highlights another of the many points at which sub-
jective choices—choices of judicial philosophy and ideology—make 
their entry into a supposedly objective measurement system. And, fi-
nally, the likelihood of manipulability is very high. Incentivized ma-
nipulation always troubles me—but it troubles me particularly in 
this context because it encourages dissent for the sake of dissent and, 
in the bargain, threatens both collegiality and the clarity of the law. 
The cruel irony of the independence index is that the act of meas-
urement threatens to destroy the thing measured. 
                                                                                                                     
 25. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 5, at 61-62. 
 26. Id. at 62. 
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 I might add that this effect is far worse than the perverse incen-
tive that Choi and Gulati attribute to the current appointment sys-
tem.27 They asseverate that judges now use voting, opinion writing, 
and dissent to signal their willingness, if elevated, to pander to the 
ideology of the appointing administration.28 In my experience, this 
seldom occurs. 
4.   Recapitulation 
 The bottom line is that I cannot credit the claim that these three 
indices constitute objective measures that aptly gauge generally ac-
cepted notions of judicial merit.29 Moreover, the costs of the Tourna-
ment proposal are yet to be calculated—and those costs must be jus-
tified against whatever meager benefits an actual Tournament might 
provide. I now turn to those costs. 
D.   The Siphoning Effect of Employing Objective Measures of Merit 
as an Initial Screen 
 The federal appellate judiciary is not a densely populated institu-
tion. Having narrowed their field to include only active federal appel-
late judges, Choi and Gulati place approximately 160 candidates in 
their Tournament.30 Although they frankly acknowledge that there 
are normative and historical objections to choosing such an exclusive 
pool as the starting point for Supreme Court appointment31—after 
all, two of the nine sitting Justices come from other venues, and Jus-
tice Souter was a sitting federal appellate judge for only a day—they 
attempt a test run of the Tournament by further narrowing the sam-
ple to ninety-eight judges (eliminating latecomers and those who did 
not remain active through June of 2003).32 
 Even more problematic than this apparent elitism is the fact that 
a tournament system aggrandizes attributes on the basis of ease of 
measurability rather than relevance to what really makes an ideal 
Supreme Court Justice.33 Other dimensions, such as temperament, 
integrity, and worldliness, are left by the wayside.34 Unless one actu-
                                                                                                                     
 27. See id. at 34. 
 28. See id. The authors concede that the threat of nomination blocking provides a 
check on overly explicit signaling; they contend, however, that judges engage in “stealth 
signal[ing]” to avoid proclaiming ideology so strongly that opinions and dissents arouse the 
other side to “muster its resources to block [the candidate].” Id. 
 29. Choi and Gulati have conceded that an actual Tournament system would not pro-
vide a perfect or even a nearly perfect measure of judicial merit. See, e.g., id. at 35-36; Choi 
& Gulati, Tournament, supra note 4, at 312. 
 30. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 5, at 28. 
 31. See id. at 40; Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 4, at 318-19. 
 32. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 5, at 40-41. 
 33. See id. at 35-36. 
 34. See id. 
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ally values publication, citation, and dissent rates as the most ex-
alted of all attributes—and I doubt that any of us who are not brain-
dead would commit to that proposition—one must acknowledge that 
a tournament system may skip over candidates who, considered ho-
listically, are the most desirable. 
 In sum, the Tournament proposal aims to circumscribe the field of 
candidates and even to limit the bounds of discourse based on a bob-
tailed version of merit. Self-imposed restraints of this order require 
heightened justification, and it does not seem to me that the elucida-
tion of the role of politics in the selection process is sufficiently im-
portant to warrant an artificial scheme that uses a three-attribute 
measure of merit to tip the selection scales in favor of particular can-
didates. I do not place such great faith in these objective indices, nor 
have I discovered in the Tournament proposal any sustainable nor-
mative argument that rates of publication, citation, and dissent are 
the most important attributes of a Supreme Court Justice. 
III.   THE EFFECTS OF OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF MERIT ON THE 
PERFORMANCE OF THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY 
 Having explored the implications of employing objective measures 
of merit in the Supreme Court selection process, I now turn to a sec-
ondary consequence of a selection system that relies heavily on such 
measures: the incentive effect, that is, the influence that the ongoing 
operation of a ranking system that holds itself out to be merit-based 
will have on the everyday performance of the federal appellate judi-
ciary. Choi and Gulati posit that promotional and reputational moti-
vations will compel judges to modify their behavior in response to a 
ranking system.35 They find this result to be desirable because they 
believe that the Tournament identifies excellence, and therefore the 
incentive to score high in the Tournament will extract optimal per-
formance from federal judges.36 I cannot quarrel with their assump-
tion that judges will react to publication of these statistics. I am less 
comfortable, however, with the premise that these incentives will 
produce a better, fairer, and more efficient judicial system. In a de-
mocracy that relies heavily on a system of checks and balances, more 
accountability is generally welcomed. But the Tournament imposes 
accountability for the wrong actions—like a failed health care system 
that compensates physicians for cloning things but not for taking 
care of patients. It also threatens the judicial independence that, un-
der our system of government, is constitutionally guaranteed. Thus, 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 4, at 300, 313-14. 
 36. See id. at 304. 
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the Tournament’s avowed mission to remedy “the lack of incentive to 
seek promotion”37 invites scrutiny. 
 I begin with a brief review of the mechanism by which Choi and 
Gulati anticipate this transformation will occur. The basic idea is 
that federal appellate judges—on the whole, a group of high achiev-
ers (and, thus, competitive)—will conform their behavior to the crite-
ria used in the Tournament in pursuit of promotion (or at least the 
bragging rights that accompany a favorable ranking).38 The public, in 
turn, will benefit from the amount of attention and care the judges 
devote to the measured tasks. Even if we set aside all questions per-
taining to (1) the competitiveness of judges and (2) the relationship 
between the proposed criteria and the development of admirable ju-
dicial traits, there remains the question whether the promised result 
justifies the introduction of an external pressure on judicial deci-
sionmaking. 
 Choi and Gulati exert little effort in addressing the implications of 
an incentive system for judicial independence. They write: 
 Whatever other objections exist, the one that we do not see room 
for is the argument that the tournament would hurt judicial inde-
pendence. If anything, the pressures that appellate judges may 
currently feel to attract political sponsors by making decisions that 
please those sponsors would be eliminated. Indeed, if there is an 
objection to our system at all, it is that judges will be made too in-
dependent under it. The tournament will thus have eliminated one 
of the few popular checks on an otherwise independent judiciary.39 
This is more a distraction than an answer to the question. Among 
other things, it disparages the emphasis that the Founders placed on 
the independence of the judiciary.40 The Federalist No. 78 heralds the 
“independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the 
faithful performance of so arduous a duty.”41 This spirit is embodied 
in Article III’s tripartite guarantee of independence, which comprises 
lifetime appointment, undiminished compensation, and exclusive 
vesting of the judicial power of the United States.42 
 Despite their importunings to the contrary, Choi and Gulati’s 
Tournament places this independence in the crosshairs. By their own 
measure, the Tournament system is successful if it exerts a force on 
federal judges that causes them to modify their behavior in a way 
                                                                                                                     
 37. Id. at 300. 
 38. See id. at 314-15. 
 39. Id. at 320-21. 
 40.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 504-05 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Modern Library 
ed. 1937) (“The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a 
limited Constitution.”). 
 41. Id. at 508. 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
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that brings it more in line with the ranked criteria. They boast that 
this will provide a degree of accountability. 
 In this context, a certain measure of accountability is healthy. We 
already require federal judges to comply with ethical rules, subject 
them to impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, and allow 
Congress to control the federal courts’ jurisdiction, budget, and rule-
making authority. But Choi and Gulati’s proposed method for ensur-
ing stellar judicial performance is a horse of a different hue. It not 
only conflicts with the Founders’ apparent distaste for perpetual job 
evaluation,43 but it also has its roots in a desire for personal ad-
vancement. Under the Tournament model, the impulse that spurs 
judges to perform to the best of their abilities comes not from a desire 
to administer perfect justice but, rather, from a desire to pursue 
promotion or indulge in an ego trip. This is not the kind of account-
ability that we should aim to inculcate. 
 One response to the admonition that objective measurements will 
jeopardize judicial independence is of the “lesser evil” brand—
servitude to the rankings will relieve judges of their existing servi-
tude to politics, so that they no longer will feel the need to modify 
their behavior to suit the ideologies of a sitting President. The hope 
is that the primary incentive will be to score better on a merit index, 
so that the system will reward good performance rather than cynical 
politicking. The trouble with this argument is that it presumes—
without an iota of proof—that the new incentive will eliminate the 
old one. What is far more likely, however, is that a judge attentive to 
her Supreme Court ambitions will be tempted to serve two gods: 
ideological purity and the Tournament rankings. 
 The second response to the judicial independence concern is that 
regardless of what motives a Tournament system arouses, one can-
not call its incentives pernicious so long as the result—better judicial 
performance—is beneficial. According to this thesis, the end justifies 
the means: We should not care if judges serve themselves or serve 
justice; the only thing that matters is that they produce timely opin-
ions, get cited, and register regular dissents.  
 With respect, that is smoke and mirrors. Motivation is material 
because it is connected to the quality of the judicial product and, con-
sequently, to the strength of the combined indices as a proxy for 
merit. As pointed out earlier, incentive-based judicial products may 
be of lower quality and, because the Tournament system is not de-
signed to detect lower quality products and treat them differentially, 
these incentive-based products quite probably will further erode the 
proxy value of the three criteria. Over time, judicial rankings will say 
                                                                                                                     
 43. See id. 
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less about actual merit and more about agility—the ability to game 
the system. 
 The inevitable secondary effect of the Tournament system thus 
undermines its primary purpose. The initial impetus for the meas-
urement system is the search for judges who exhibit certain qualities 
that comport with the ideal of a jurist who will serve justice well, but 
because this is a reward-offering search, a tournament may instead 
lead us to judges who, like Pavlov’s dogs, respond well to incentives 
and who understand what manipulations will create an apparent 
match to that ideal.  
IV.   THE INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS OF OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF MERIT 
ON THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY 
 If the President and the Senate were to embrace an empirical 
ranking system to assist them in their respective nomination and 
confirmation responsibilities, other consequences would follow. I fo-
cus here on the implications for relations within and between circuits 
and the potential impact on the legitimacy of the federal appellate 
judiciary.  
A.   The Effect of Competitive Ranking Systems on Intracircuit and 
Intercircuit Relations 
 It does not take a sophisticated analysis to point out that intro-
ducing an assessment system that pushes judges to vie for position 
against one another will create potentially unhealthy competitive 
pressures. Within circuits, the parade of horribles would look some-
thing like this: division of labor would become a constant bone of con-
tention, particularly with respect to the assignment of opinions; the 
independence index would spawn superfluous dissents, thereby caus-
ing damage both to collegiality and to the rule of law; and the rank-
ings would create an explicit pecking order for an already competi-
tive process of hiring law clerks. In short, this sort of competition 
would have unhealthy consequences for the way that we work with 
one another. 
 A second set of consequences would imperil intercircuit relations 
and could well lead to the isolation of the law of each circuit. Notably, 
the particular quality index that Choi and Gulati have selected to 
plug into their composite formula primarily measures “outside cita-
tions,” meaning citations by judges from other courts.44 Because the 
Tournament ascribes a high value to cross-circuit citation but no 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 5, at 71 (stating that the quality 
index consists of an adjusted figure representing the number of outside citations for a 
judge’s top twenty opinions and the number of invocations). 
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value to intracircuit citation, a judge can cite to an intracircuit col-
league without increasing her score but may be reluctant to cite an 
intercircuit colleague, who is also her competitor. After all, doing so 
would give the cited judge a boost in the rankings. This consequence 
may discourage citation to opinions from other circuits that, while 
not controlling authority, are illuminating and persuasive, even 
though such reliance would contribute to uniform development of 
federal law. In the worst-case scenario, this undesirable strain on the 
conversation between circuits as they encounter novel questions of 
law may even encourage artificial circuit splits or uncertainties about 
whether circuits agree or disagree on particular points of law. 
 Another consequence arises from the eventuality that the rank-
ings will generate notions of prestige that attach to the reputation of 
the circuit at large. Circuits that do not host a high-ranking Tour-
nament competitor may command less respect or attention from 
other judges, lawyers, academics, and clerkship aspirants. Those cir-
cuits may then suffer from circumscribed influence on the develop-
ment of the law. Though effects of this kind are subtle, they are as 
difficult to control as they are to detect. 
 The more general point is that rankings tend to assert a peculiar 
power in our society, whereby they come to define our entire percep-
tion of the things they measure instead of providing a limited set of 
information about those things. And, in practical terms, it is impos-
sible to cabin the influence of rankings to the narrow purpose for 
which they were designed. 
B.   Life at the Bottom and Judicial Legitimacy 
 Even though ranking systems are inherently relative, they inevi-
tably give rise to labels that quickly become cemented to the name 
and reputation of each ranked member. If decisionmakers credit ju-
dicial rankings by relying upon them, the public and the legal com-
munity may come to perceive a judge ranked at or near the bottom 
not just as relatively less productive, less respected, or less inde-
pendent than his peers but also as a rotten judge. This presumption 
of incompetence would emerge regardless of the fact that virtually 
the entire membership of the federal appellate bench is first-rate. In 
a ranked list, someone has got to wind up at the bottom. 
 The rankings also could warp the legitimacy of bottom-tier judges. 
Low rankings and their attendant consequences may alienate the 
judges who receive them. A system that effectively creates a second-
class judiciary could come to define entire careers. I fear that an en-
trenched ranking system would make it far too easy to forget that 
every federal appellate judge has been entrusted by the President 
and the Senate to hold the federal judicial power for life. 
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V.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 One thing can be said with certainty about Choi and Gulati’s 
Tournament of Judges: it catapults us into an engaging metaphysical 
experiment. In the end, however, I think that it sends us down an 
unsightly path. The now-popular spectacle of university hierarchs 
scrambling to game the U.S. News and World Report rankings would 
caution us to avoid that path. 
 In my view, the judiciary would do well to keep its pikestaffs at 
parade rest and eschew the jousting that Choi and Galuti invite. Ob-
jective measures such as they describe are likely to supply informa-
tion that is only marginally beneficial in a system that performs well 
in identifying talented candidates. That information is as likely to 
obscure political motives as it is to expose them. Moreover, the sug-
gested measures may be wildly inexact proxies for merit. The gains 
that a Tournament would provide are modest at most—and the cost 
of them, should they materialize, is the infliction of substantial 
harm.  
 To cinch matters, artificially grafting the proposed measures of 
judicial performance onto the current selection process misconceives 
the concept of Supreme Court elevation by portraying a Court va-
cancy as the ultimate reward to which objectively deserving federal 
appellate judges are entitled. That is as wrong as wrong can be. We 
ought to understand nomination and confirmation as a complex 
search for an individual who will best serve the nation at a particular 
point in time. Suitability for service on the Court cannot be reduced 
to a matter of baseball card statistics. From that perspective, the ef-
fort to line up the federal judiciary into tidy rows, ordered exclusively 
by a handful of objectively measurable considerations, interferes with 
what is a much broader process. What is more, the business of the 
federal appellate judiciary is the administration of justice through 
the exercise of Article III jurisdiction. As it stands, a Supreme Court 
vacancy is an infrequent interruption of that business. Thus, it 
makes little sense to advertise the unlikely prospect that political 
lightning will strike as a legitimate daily preoccupation for federal 
appellate judges. It makes even less sense to hope that federal judges 
will indulge in such a distraction. 
 In the last analysis, federal appellate opinions are not applica-
tions for employment on the Supreme Court. Scoring judges as if that 
were the endgame takes too narrow a view of a President’s preroga-
tives while at the same time encouraging the membership of an in-
dependent judiciary to subordinate judicial wisdom to the whims of 
personal ambition. Objectively speaking, the Tournament proposal 
strikes out on its pitch that it will produce merit-based decisionmak-
ing and transparency. 
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